23-HP and EDS: The Product Case

Posted 5/27/08

This entry is the first in our series of four entries on the HP/EDS deal.

The Setting

Hewlett Packard has proposed a take-over of EDS, in order to improve its services, revenues and profits. EDS is #2 to IBM in the computer services industry. Hewlett Packard is #5. The combined company, at $38 billion in revenues, would have only a 5% share of the market. IBM has $54 billion in services revenues and 7% market share. The reaction in the stock market has been mixed. Hewlett Packard stockholders don’t like it. Its share price fell. The EDS shareholders like it a lot better, as their shares increased in value.

A company undertakes an acquisition to achieve one or more of three objectives: first, acquire a product that it does not have; second, acquire customers that it otherwise could not service; and third, establish a new lower unit cost through the combination of the two companies. We will look at each of these, in turn, in the current HP and EDS deal and then summarize our conclusions in the last entry.

The Product Case

Combining these two companies is an important, but not the final, step toward answering the product needs of HP in the marketplace. The combination of the two product lines is positive since the two current lines are complementary. EDS covers more of the services business than does HP. EDS offers many services, including running mainframe systems, help desks and managing billing and payroll systems. The HP services business is more attuned to supporting its hardware product sales. It is best known for managing infrastructure, such as server systems.

The bad news is that both HP and EDS are losing market share in the computer services industry. The industry is growing at 8-10% a year. Both HP and EDS have slower growth rates. Both companies suffer from some kind of performance problem, i.e., the Functionality, Reliability or Convenience of the product purchase. (See the Perspective “How Customers Buy” in the Tools/Perspectives section of StrategyStreet.) The combined company will have to overcome these market weaknesses to become a star performer.

IBM, the market leader, offers Functionality that the combined company does not offer today. IBM offers a broader array of business consulting skills than either HP or EDS possess. IBM uses these superior consulting skills to create capabilities that are unique in the marketplace. And because these skills are unique, they command a price premium. This price premium explains at least part of the differences in the operating profits of IBM compared to its peers in services.

This combination certainly increases the product portfolio of both companies. In order to round out that portfolio, another acquisition involving a company or companies that have broader business consulting skills is necessary and likely.

In our next blog entry on this merger, we will talk about the combined company’s prospects for customer acquisition.

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Update 2022:

HP’s attack on IBM by way of acquisition failed to produce a unique product to entice many new customers to HP’s portfolio. It did help the company remain in the game as a significant player.

Born out of HP’s split, HPE focuses on enterprise products and services. Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE) was created in 2015 when HP split its operation into two. On one side is HP Inc, the printer and PC arm of the company, while HPE deals with enterprise products and services.

As of its September 2021 quarter, DXC Technology, which contains much of the old EDS, had sales of $4 billion, down 11.6% from the same quarter a year earlier. The company was operating at a net loss. In its December 2021 quarter, IBM reported sales of $16.7 billion, an increase of 6.5% over the year-earlier quarter. IBM was profitable.

We believe that customers buy according to a hierarchy of needs. There are four of these needs and customers review supplier offerings in an order we call the Customer Buying Hierarchy. HERE is a short video describing the Customer Buying Hierarchy. To review how to segment your customers by need, go HERE. On this page you can use our many segmentation concepts and examples to brainstorm improvements for your own company.

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Update 10/26

The 2026 computer services business includes three key services: the provision of IT infrastructure, managed as well as cloud services and consulting. IBM, HP and EDS were among its leaders in 2008, when the market was $806 billion and IBM held about 7%. Gartner puts 2025 IT services spending at about $1.5 trillion. In cloud infrastructure, the three leading market share holders are today’s Standard Leaders: AWS from Amazon (28% share), Azure from Microsoft (20% share) and Google cloud (15% share). Together, they hold 63% of cloud infrastructure market share, according to Synergy Research’s second-quarter 2026 data. Other competitors hold low single-digit shares.

These three leaders completely reimagined the computer services business into a much broader concept that covers far more of the customer’s needs: computing capacity and storage on demand, managed databases, security, development tools and machine-learning toolkits, with no hardware for the customer to buy or run. The original business leaders, IBM and HP, were selling their own hardware and the proprietary software that accompanied the hardware. They were superseded by today’s leaders who innovated with cloud computing (a Function), digital transformation (a Function), on-demand services (Convenience) and pay-as-you-go (Price) tech models. These innovations relieved the customer of work, adding Function and Convenience benefits that IBM, HP and EDS did not offer. These began as Next Leader Transformer competitors and are now the Standard Leaders.

The three leaders of today have developed extensive networks of global data centers for cloud computing, specialized cloud utilization products and advanced machine learning toolkits. These Function innovations offered turnkey solutions and rapid scalability to all customers (Function and Convenience). These innovations create wide moats.

IBM, HP and EDS, erstwhile industry leaders, failed in the cloud services business where they were once leaders. Product Parochialism struck all three. Each defended its own hardware, software and outsourcing contracts and did not copy the Transformers’ broader benefits in time. IBM and HP did try, but late and still tied to their own products: IBM bought SoftLayer in 2013, and HP opened a public cloud and closed it in 2016. While they held this position, demand shifted to new Function benefits including the cloud, open-source platforms and integration flexibility. Customers slowly migrated away from HP and IBM. HP’s services business, with EDS inside it, became DXC in 2017, and DXC’s revenue has fallen every year since FY2018, to $12.6 billion in fiscal 2026, under 1% of the market (an estimate). IBM spun off its outsourcing business as Kyndryl in 2021, and PAC now ranks IBM second in IT services by 2025 revenue, behind Accenture. IBM Consulting, at $21.1 billion in 2025, holds about 1.4% (an estimate). Both estimates use Gartner’s IT services total of about $1.5 trillion. IBM and HPE grew in other markets: IBM in software and mainframes, HPE in networking. (For a similar story with a different ending see our Blog 12-Google versus Microsoft in the Office).

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Quick Hits

Five patterns from the StrategyStreet system this story confirms.

  1. Adding a complementary product line does not fix a Performance (FRC) problem. HP and EDS fit together in 2008, yet both were losing share in an industry growing 8% to 10%. The deal left the combined company at 5% share against IBM’s 7%. Nine years later HPE merged the services business into DXC, and DXC’s revenue, $12.6 billion in fiscal 2026, has fallen every year since FY2018.
  2. Product Parochialism cost the leaders their market. IBM, HP and EDS defended their own hardware, software and outsourcing contracts while AWS, Azure and Google, Next Leader Transformers, rebuilt computer services around far more of the customer’s needs. IBM bought SoftLayer in 2013 and HP closed its public cloud in 2016, too late and still tied to their own products. The three began as Next Leaders and are now the Standard Leaders in cloud infrastructure.
  3. A 5% share in a fragmented market is not leadership, however large the revenue. Consolidation of two large services companies produced $38 billion of revenue and 5% of the market. What is left of that revenue, DXC at $12.6 billion, is under 1% of today’s market on Gartner’s IT services total (an estimate). Real concentration came later, in cloud infrastructure, where the three leaders hold 63%.
  4. Unique skills earn a price premium, and a bigger catalog does not. IBM’s broader consulting skills were unique and commanded a premium, which explained part of its profit gap over its services peers in 2008. HP and EDS together offered more services but no skill IBM lacked. Today the cloud leaders sell by the hour, so the premium sits in AI and consulting.
  5. The Economies of Scale that matter come from the right assets, not from combined size. HP bought EDS for about $13.9 billion to gain scale in services. The scale that paid went to the three cloud leaders with global data-center networks and machine-learning toolkits, which the Update calls “wide moats.” Spend in their market reached $143.4 billion in a single quarter of 2026.

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